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4 Reasons Your Retirement Is Riskier Than Your Parents’

Tuesday, May 31, 2011

A recent article in SmartMoney highlights a topic that has been front and center for financial planners for awhile now - the fact that retirement is changing, and funding retirement is a dicier proposition than it used to be.

The article is titled 4 Reasons Your Retirement Is Riskier Than Your Parents’.  It is based on a National Retirement Risk Index that has been developed by the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College.  In this case, "risk" is defined as the likelihood that we'll be able to maintain our standard of living beyond the age of 65, and the concerns outlined pertain to both Baby Boomers and Gen Xers.  The trend identified in the study clearly leans toward less and less preparedness the farther we are from retirement.  In other words, Boomers are not very well prepared compared to their parents, but we Gen Xers have it worse than the Boomers.

The drivers behind the heightened uncertainty are grouped into four trends:

  1. We're living longer.  Of course, this would be less of an issue if we're also working longer, and I suspect that will be a new development as we progress, but right now the study shows the average retirement age at 64 for men, and 63 for women. 

  2. Replacement rates are falling.  In this case, replacement rate refers to the percentage of income that is replaced by retirement benefits.  As we move forward, the amount of Social Security that we'll receive is decreasing.  Furthermore, although the article points out that the share of the workforce that is covered by an employer plan has remained steady, the nature and amount of that coverage has changed.  Defined benefit plans, in which a retiree received a fixed percentage of salary, are increasingly rare.  Defined-contribution plans, such as a 401(k), in which employees contribute to prepare for retirements, are now the norm.  This puts more burden on individual employees to save an appropriate amount and to invest it prudently.  That may not be an outrageous expectation, but it's not happening.  As the article points out, the median balance for heads of households entering retirement is only $78,000.  That is not going to go very far, especially as Social Security coverage decreases.

  3. Retiree-paid health costs are rising.  This subject is a bit harder to predict, as we await the longevity and full implementation of Obamacare.  However, it's hard to imagine the government picking up more of the tab for the same level of care, given the current underfunding for entitlement programs.  It's possible that we'll somehow see a reduction in the inflation rate of health care costs, but that has not been the trend and it's probably not a solid assumption to make when planning for retirement.

  4. Returns have declined.  This is perhaps the shakiest point in the article.  It is true as stated:  asset returns generally have declined over the past two decades, and bond yields are certainly well below average.  However, to a certain degree recent declines have helped to ensure that future growth will be stronger.  I think a more valid point is that we've seen the effect that reverting to average long-term returns can have, and it pays to be conservative when making assumptions about future asset growth for the sake of retirement planning.

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401k | Retirement Planning

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Periodic blog disclaimer

Thursday, May 26, 2011

Being an independent fee-only financial planner and investment advisor helps to ensure that I do not have to go through a lengthy approval process with a centralized compliance department prior to posting an addition to my blog.  (It also means that I'm not required to peddle the latest "hot", commission-generating product that a sales director foists on me, and I won't win any trips to Bermuda for unloading double top secret annuitized income bazookas on unsuspecting seniors, but I digress.)

Regardless, the lack of a bureaucratic compliance department does not imply the lack of a need for compliance.  So this is for the lawyers:  this site is for educational and informational purposes only.  In no way should any content be construed as personalized tax, investment, or financial advice. Readers of this blog and website should consult with a qualified adviser to obtain advice suited to their personal circumstances.

 

Tags:

General

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Inexplicable and Inexcusable

Monday, May 23, 2011

Better late than never.  Per my previous post pertaining to the Berkshire Hathway shareholder meeting, I wanted to touch on Buffett's comments regarding the Sokol scandal.  This topic was pretty much the only one being discussed in anticipation of the meeting, and it threatened to overwhelm the entire day.  Buffett did a good job of ensuring that didn't happen by addressing the issue head-on, early in the day.

As is the standard, the meeting kicked off with a movie that included commercials for products and services offered by Berkshire companies, as well as footage from various sources that are assumedly deemed relevant to the present day. Nothing was really more relevant than the discussion around Buffett's 1991 assumption of the chairmanship at Salomon Brothers, during which he was asked what had happened at Salomon.  At the time, he was new to what was going on at Salomon, and so he couldn't speak to a lot of details, but he offered the opinion that the rogue trading that had taken place was "inexplicable and inexcusable".  He then likened that activity to Sokol's actions.

The inexcusable piece of the discussion was fairly obvious.  Sokol violated Berkshire's code of ethics in grand fashion, and there's not much than can be said to defend his actions, unless there's a huge element of this that the public doesn't know.

The inexplicable was a bit more puzzling, which I guess pretty much defines the term.  In any case, Buffett cited two primary reasons.

The first was that Sokol made no attempt to hide his trades.  Schemers engaged in insider trading typically set up their "third cousin", or "trusts in Luxembourg" to disguise the fact that they are the players behind a trade.  Regulators routinely review trading activity in the weeks leading up to a merger to determine if anything untoward occurred.  Pretty odd behavior for somebody how is knowingly doing something illegal or unethical.  My take:  we obviously knew about Sokol's trades, although we have no way of knowing (so far) if there were additional disguised trades.  That seems unlikely to me.  More likely is the fact that he somehow thought what he was doing was acceptable.  However, we're talking about a smart, knowledgeable guy, and the idea that he didn't know is truly inexplicable.

The next inexplicable factor was that Sokol didn't need the money.  He made $24 million in Berkshire compensation last year.  Buffett hastens to add that we Berkshire shareholders got our money's worth.  Of course, greed comes in all shapes and sizes, and we've certainly seen egregious examples from wealthier people than David Sokol.  Lest we think that's the end of it, Buffett shared a story that makes the greed explanation less plausible.  In 1999, Berkshire Hathaway bought the majority of MidAmerican Energy, of which David Sokol was the largest shareholder.  A couple of years later, long-time Berkshire board member Walter Scott suggested to Buffett a special compensation plan for Sokol and his right-hand man Greg Abe, in case MidAmerican knocked it out of the park.  They designed a plan that would pay Sokol $50m and Abel $25m if MidAmerican hit some very ambitious growth numbers.  Buffett presented the plan to Sokol - behind closed doors - and Sokol stated that it was very generous, but he wanted to see one change.  That change was that he felt the $75m should be split evenly between he and Greg Abel.  In other words, he voluntarily gave up $12.5m in a manner that would receive no publicity at all.  Not the actions of an especially greedy individual.  Buffett had a hard time reconciling that with the $3m or so that Sokol gained from his Lubrizol trades.  My take:  inexplicable indeed.  Who knows, though...the bonus arrangement was 10 years ago, and people change.

Buffett summed up the entire situation by saying, more or less directly..."there we are with a situation, which is sad for Berkshire, sad for Dave, still inexplicable in my mind".  Charlie Munger displayed his typical economy of words when asked about his take, saying "I think it's generally a mistake to assume that rationality is going to be perfect even in very able people. We prove that pretty well regularly."

In perhaps the most logical explanation of all, when asked the reason for irrationality, Munger suggested that "...hubris contributes to it".  I think we can safely say that that has been proven very regularly.

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Berkshire Hathaway

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Thoughts on the Berkshire Hathaway shareholder meeting

Tuesday, May 03, 2011

 

I've just returned from my annual trek to Omaha and the Berkshire Hathaway shareholder meeting, and will share my thoughts and observations via this blog over the next week or so.  Although I pretty quickly hit my tolerance limit in the Exhibition Hall where a broad array of wares are peddled by Berkshire-owned  companies (and where I invariably drop a few bucks on gifts for my kids), I can't imagine ever tiring of the meeting itself or the opportunity to spend time with smart, successful people who share common interests.

The primary value of the weekend, of course, comes from the meeting itself.  Many of the themes - and even some of the anecdotal stories - are consistent year to year, but wisdom doesn't get old.  The thoughts Ishare will hit on topics that were of particular interest to me, and they won't necessarily be comprehensive, but feel free to ping me if youhave any specific questions that I don't cover.

I'll start with the fact that I was interviewed several days beforethe meeting about what I was looking to hear from Warren and Charlie Munger, and my broad response was that I was anxious to hear more about corporate governance in light of the David Sokol affair.  As with most interviews, we had a lengthly discussion and a very small part made it through, but I'll make no apologies for things I've said.  Shortly after the interview, Berkshire Hathaway's audit committee came out with their scathing report on the actions of David Sokol. That was effectively the first thing we had heard from Berkshire since Sokol's resignation, and I was extrememely pleased to read it.  In 1991, Buffett  famously said "lose money for the firm and I will be understanding; lose a shred of reputation for the firm and I will be ruthless".  That type of ruthlessness is way lacking in corporate America, and Berkshire Hathaway has been a beacon for all of industry interms of corporate governance.  I was concerned that legalities or simply loyalty for past performance could get in the way of ruthlessly and publicly enforcing good governance.  That was important for shareholders and important for American capitalism.

Here's a link to a quote from that interview - Kevin O'Reilly's expectations for Berkshire Hathaway meeting.
 
My next post will cover what Buffett had to say about the issue. 

 

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Berkshire Hathaway

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